Masters and Commanders
Burgis Material
Readers may judge for themselves whether my renderings of Lawrence Burgis’ annotations in the verbatim War Cabinet papers in the Burgis Papers at the Churchill Archives in Cambridge are accurate, as I enclose below what he wrote, with my assumptions in square brackets. The contexts and references can be found in the relevant chapters of the book:
Chapter 2
[We must] Address [a] substantively new sit[uation] to [that] wh[ich] existed last week. G[ermany] is about to dec[lare] war [against the] US. Jap[an has] att[acked] G[reat] B[ritain] & [the] US [and] placed [the] right battle [group] at [the] right spot, [but the US has] not lost all [her ships, although there has been a] Disaster in [the] Pac[ific]. Pearl Har[bor was] taken by surprise, maltreated … Jap[an is in] complete control from Cape [Horn] to Van[couver]. In [a] sense [they] can … land at any particular island or place – a sit[uation] no-one supposed w[oul]d occur. [We will] have to put up [with a] lot of punish[ment] till [the] sit[uation] can be brought around.
Chapter 3
‘[The] President and [his] wife [were] kind and hospit[able]. [I] lived in intimacy [with them], just up [the corridor from the] Map Room … [The] first day after [I] arrived [FDR came in and I had] time to grab a towel … [The] last thing he said [when he] came to see me off [was ‘]To the bitter end, trust me.[’ We are suffering] Heavy blows … [but the US is] setting about the war with great vigour … [they have] jumped right into it. [There is a] sense of resolve to fight it on. [They] have tactical ideas of war, H[itler is] the enemy, [they will] do what can re: Japan. But … nothing [will get] in the way in way of def[eating] H[itler].’
Churchill then spoke of the United States ‘occ[upying the] N[orth] & W[est] Africa[n] Coast. [If they could] win it [it would be a vital] factor [for our Mediterranean] shipping – 60 [Infantry] Div[isions and] 10 Arm[oured] Div[isions] is what they are aiming [for] – they should be enough. … [The Americans are] Anxious to get into combat with [the] enemy. [There is] Olympian calm at [the] White House.
‘[All] in all their Cab[inet] feel that have got over the hump of the war. If [they] do it well [they will] do it [in 19]43, if clumsily [19]44 or [19]45. Supplies of matériel and manpower are overwhelming.’ Over the Arcadia agreements, Churchill said: ‘Marshall, Hopkins & [the] Pres[ident wanted] unity of command in [the] Far East – I was at first against it ([I was] impressed with Marshall [who is] not narrow). He proposed Wavell. … Anyone [who has] seen what [has] happened since [will see that it] shows how necessary it was.’
Churchill said he had also ‘proposed to Marshall [to] take Brig[ades] at a time for [guard] duty on the [English] beaches – they w[oul]d like that – troops [should be] used that want training – not [their] best troops [as they need to] keep them for N[orth] Africa.’ Later in his briefing, Churchill told the War Cabinet that he had been ‘Impressed with calibre of [the] 3 [American] C[hiefs] O[f] S[taff]’, and that since Admiral Stark’s ‘no’s up’ [i.e. number’s up, because of Pearl Harbor], ‘Adm[iral] King is [the] man [with] whom we shall have to deal’.
Pausing only to reminisce about his journey back – ‘I drove [the] plane for a bit … [the] engines purred like happy kittens’ – Churchill then gave a global overview of strategy. ‘Acc[ording] to [the] classic rules of war, [you] stave off one and crush the other. Well we’ve done that; they have only 1/3 [of North Africa] left [and when] pushed out of Cyrenaica: [the] picture [will] then [be] all altered. If [we had] squandered our strength [we would be] thin and diss[ippated before] a war that had not begun. [We would have] Been guilty of grossest error of policy. [We] Should not have got through but for Russia. … [There is] No use supposing we [can] keep [a] lot of a/c [aircraft] and tanks [in Britain]. All [must be] disposed of to best ability. Then the [Japanese will feel the] … power of [the] US – they’ll never forgive Pearl Harbour – they will find her and disarm her … [They] Feel over the hump.’
Churchill said that thirty-seven thousand men had already been sent to defend Singapore and it was the ‘Will of [the] Cab[inet] to defend [it] to [the] last.’38.5
Chapter 4
Churchill warned the War Cabinet that Britain was: ‘In for a rough time. [There will be] Smashing blows [but we will] not come out bust. [There must be] No gloom or disheartenment. [We must] Send [what] force we can [to Burma]. [We have to] Screw down rations [and not] Eat into reserves of food. [The] Army at home [must] brace themselves.’
Of Hitler’s invasion of Russia, Churchill said: ‘It came from God – we did nothing about it. … War can’t end [in] 1942 – optimist[ically] 1943.’
Churchill said that he had heard from Ivan Maisky that ‘Evid[ently] G[ermany] going to use gas in new [Russian] offensive. We [would] treat use of gas ag[ain]st R[ussia] as ag[ain]st us. We w[oul]d retal[iate] against Germany. We [will] make common cause with R[ussia] over that and he [i.e. Maisky] consid[ered] we c[oul]d deter G[ermany] by making an announ[cemen]t. If he wanted us to do so [we needed] plenty of warning. Go into gas mask sit[uation] Furbish them up and [it would be a] good thing to use them every day.’ To this, Brooke added that we had to ‘Work out carefully what our [gas] reserves are. Must go 100% out if we start.’
Chapter 6
Churchill ‘congratulated’ Portal on a ‘Great manifestation of air power. US like it v[ery] much. Give us bigger action [again] early next month.’
Chapter 7
Churchill on the battle of Midway: ‘Losses at sea [have produced] signs of fear on part of Japs – [the] Navy [is a] polit[ical] force in Japan, [which will] perhaps [be] more inclined to [a] restrictive and cautious policy. This policy [might] be in harmony with sending out sub[marine] raiders. If [we] think of this as having [an effect] on [the] Jap sit[uation, I] think they will go for China and Chiang Kai Shek conquest. [I] Don’t think they’ll try India or Aus[tralia. This gives us] two or three months breathing-space. We [must] come to rescue of China – [it would be an] appalling disaster if China [were forced] out of the war [and a] new gov[ernment]t set up. [The General] staff [should] think of attacking lines of commun[ication] in Burma. If carrier losses [are] confirmed [we can] review [the] consequences of diminution of enemy forces. If J[apan] adopts conservative course [it is a] chance for us to get teeth into her tail.’ Brooke answered that there was a ‘poss[ibility] of opening up [the] B[urma] Road [in the] next two or three months to land pract[ical] mil[itary aid].’ Churchill answered: ‘Tell C[hiang] K[ai] S[hek to] hold [the] fort because we are coming (next Oct or Nov).’ Asking for a report from Wavell, Churchill said: ‘[The] further removed from danger and fighting[, the] more dangers and responsibilities seem to weigh with officers’.
Chapter 9
Churchill asked ‘What [led] 30,000 [men to] surrender at Tobruk[?]’ adding, ‘orders [were] given [to] generals not to surrender w[ith]out express permission from home. Some order [should be] given that generals [will be] put on capital charge if [they] surrender (after the war) in C-in-C some other generals sh[oul]d not be affected. Enquire re 4,000 tons of petrol Tobruk left.’
Churchill reported to the War Cabinet about Stalin, whom he described as a ‘large man’ of ‘great sagacity’. His visit had ‘Explained some past mysteries’ about Stalin’s behaviour before the war, and the rebuffing of British military mission to Moscow in August 1939. Stalin had said that he had been ‘certain B[ritain] didn’t intend war, [and] would frame-up with French. [This was] Confirmed by our offers – France [of] 80 divisions, Britain [of] 3 divisions. [Stalin had been] Sure Hitler wasn’t bluffing. At Munich an effort might have been made, after that nil was our offered strength.’
Churchill on the Hess flight: ‘H[ess] arrived, hot from Hit[ler’s] entourage, [and] came to do g[rea]t service for G[ermany] [at] G[reat]t risk. [He wanted to be] … conduc[ted] to the King [to say] that we [i.e. the Churchill ministry] had no backing here and [to get] a Gov[ernmen]t of [the pro-]Munich complex[ion] installed. Hess [was] suffering from melancholia. [We] tried to make him talk. … [He] Gave us last chance [for peace] and [the] chance of joining [the] crusade against Russia. But he never said a word about his [Cabinet friends] who he [had] come to see. [He] Had [once] met [the Duke of] Hamilton.’
Churchill wanted to ‘Bomb Italy, bring [it] forward as fast as possible’, ordering Brooke to ‘Have it studied, worked out and report next week.’ He added proudly that the ‘B[ritish] E[mpire] played [the] leading part of this terrific event’, predicting that it ‘mean[t] the oblit[eration] of [the] G[erman] & I[talian] forces in Libya & Egypt’ and announcing that he would ‘Mark [the] victory in respect of Alex[ander] and Mont[gomery with] high reward and promotion’, since it was ‘One of the g[rea]test victories won by [the] B[ritish] E[mpire] in the field. It’s a fine story.’ He then formally congratulated Brooke and Grigg for a ‘brilliant showing’, saying that the ‘movement of [the invasion] convoy without loss [was a] marvellous story [with] 105 warships, 142 troop and supply ships.’
Chapter 10
Churchill explained how Admiral ‘D’A[rlan] [is] contemptible figure. Whilst [the] Fr[ench] Navy [was] fighting, D’A[rlan was] negotiating. [He was] Now advising [the] Fr[ench] to fight against G[ermany].’ Churchill equally despised Giraud, who, he said: ‘1) signed [a] letter to P[étain] saying he w[oul]d behave, 2) then manoeuvred to get power for himself, 3) now he’s acc[epted a] commission from E[isenhower] to fight.’ Eden thought Eisenhower’s policy towards Darlan would outrage British opinion, and Churchill pointed out: ‘He’s not our C-in-C – Eis[enhower is] respon[sible] to [the] W[ashing]ton authorities. [We] Can’t afford to upset Eis[enhower] just now’, he said, concluding ‘Eis[enhower] is our friend – grand fellow – [we] don’t want to get across him.’
At a War Cabinet Churchill commented that the ‘Mediterranean must be regarded as [an] inadequate contrib[ution] to the battle. [We must] not only fool around in [the] Mediterranean. [It would be a] Calamity if [it] got in R[ussia’s] mind [we were only] going to contribute with Med[iterranean] next year.’
Chapter 12
Churchill said: ‘Not happy about f[ighting] in the north, [we] uniformly had the worst of it. Looks as if G[ermany is] beating us unit for unit, [despite the fact that] we [have] greater artillery than the enemy.’
Reporting to the War Cabinet on his return to London, Churchill said his ‘Journey [had been] justified [because of the Anglo-American] difference in point of view. [The] US masses’ attention [was] turned mainly on Japan and tend[ed] to think it more important to keep China in [the war] than Russia. At [the] outset [there were] sharp differences between [Chiefs of] staffs. [Theirs] Suggested that concentration on Italy and [the] Mediterranean would interfere with Bolero and would even prolong the war. But personal contacts and personal friendships broke this down and agreement was reached. This document agrees on Italy being the target: but we’ve undertaken to move some troops back at intervals for Bolero. [Over] Anakim [there were] differences also. We came to [the] conclusion [there was] no reason to re-open [the] Burma Road until mid ’45. But all the same we must fight, wherever we can engage the enemy. … US public hadn’t realised until I said it to Congress that [the] greater part of US forces are deployed in Pacific. [The] US Executive treats Congress as an enemy, [and was] surprised at the sort of speech I made, though I said it was common form for the House of Commons. US opinion [is] quite cool about North Africa. Strategic issues [were] settled in broad outline. Whereas a year ago we had to say ‘Hitler first and Tojo after’ there is now enough force to take a rather different view – a matter of emphasis now, not of choice. … Eisenhower [was] inclined to go for Sardinia before Italy: I strongly advocate second, then [the] first will fall in. I therefore went to see Eisenhower and took General Marshall with me. Marshall rewrote the paper for communication to Russia … this document [is] evidence of [his] great mental grasp. His visit to Africa with me has done him good – widened his appreciation of [the] African campaign.56
Chapter 13
Churchill welcomed the ‘Great Husky success’ saying that ‘Generally speaking [we are] over [the] first and most deadly phase. [A] Letter from Eisenhower says after first 48 hours most critical time will come. … Think myself very satisfied indeed. Syracuse captured before daybreak yesterday. Nothing like it I’ve ever read of.’
On the Bethnal Green tube disaster, Churchill declared himself ‘Against giving such limelight to this incident. … [It would give] Disproportionate importance, [and be] meat & drink to enemy & [an] invitation to repeat. [We will] Say [the] Report [was] received and considered: no need to publish: [and] all its lessons are being vigorously applied. Why publish? [The] Government’s position is unassailable. Moreover we said earlier [there had been] “no panic”: this makes clear there was panic and it was part[ly the] cause: and this we are withholding.’
Over the command structure of Operation Husky, Churchill reported ‘We have suggested [it would be] administratively convenient to have [a] British commander and joint staff all under Eisenhower. But we may have to argue on [the] basis that command goes with major forces. … And no US Navy goes inside [the] Med[iterranean]. On this, Husky couldn’t be more than equal share. [I] Don’t feel we should give way.’
Chapter 16
Churchill told the War Cabinet of ‘Serious disaffection about [the Anzio] landings. First [phase] has not yielded brilliant results. … German offensive started. Great disappointment so far. … Remarkable limitations of air, unable to prevent enemy from flinging his troops from one Front to another. … [A] Great opportunity has been lost, but may be regained. … We have got a lot to learn in the way of seizing opportunities before [we can] beat these people.’
Churchill reassured the War Cabinet about the Anzio beachhead on 14 February, where there were 130,000 men and twenty thousand vehicles, as well as local superiority in artillery and tanks. ‘No reason to suppose [the] situation dangerous,’ he said. ‘Must keep good nerves this year.’ Brooke then informed them further about the heavy fighting at and bombing of the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino. ‘Nothing to regret [that the] scale of [the] fighting has magnified,’ added Churchill.
Chapter 17
‘De Gaulle refuses to participate. [It is an] Odious example of his malice … [he has] no regard for common causes – [I] may have to exhibit him in his true light, [as a] false and puffed up personality.’
Chapter 20
Reporting on Yalta, Churchill said it was ‘Imposs[ible] to convey [the] true atmosphere of discussions between the Three. Stalin I’m sure means well to the world and Poland. … [The military] situation [has] undergone extraordinary change, in three weeks [the] Russian army [crossed the River] Vistula to [the Oder]. [Stalin has offered the] Polish people [a] free and more broadly-based gov[ernmen]t to bring about [an] election; [I] cannot conceive any gov[ernmen]t has [the] right to be treated like that. S[talin] about Poland said ‘Russia has committed many sins about Poland – pacts and [partitions] – [it is] not [the] intention of [the] Soviet Government to do such things but to make amends.’ President [Roosevelt was] very feeble – but when [he] showed [he] did not want a thing to be done, S[talin] withdrew his request. Very important other matters [were] settled, [including an] agreement signed re Japan on [the] basis [that] Russia gets back what [she] lost in [the] Russo-Japanese War subject to agreement with Chiang Kai-Shek. [Stalin had a] Very good feeling with [the] two Western democracies [and wants] to work quite easily with us. [He was] not jarred by [the] US and us speaking [the] same language. My hopes lie in a single man, he will not embark on bad adventures. Re: Greece – Stalin was jocular … He does what he like[s] in Bulgaria, Roumania – [and] leave[s] us [alone] in Greece. He held his own people off; he made bargain with them [and] they have [a] great desire to keep it. [Russian] Troops [have a] wonderful bearing.
